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INTRODUCTION

Minnesota recently joined the majority of states that apply the vicarious
liability doctrine of apparent authority to hospitals for the negligence of
independent contractor physicians in emergency rooms. 1 In Popovich v.
Allina Health Systems, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified previous
decisions involving vicarious liability in emergency rooms, stating that the
previous holdings conflated the two underlying doctrines of respondeat
superior and apparent authority. 2 The court rejected an exclusive exemption
for hospitals from the widely applied doctrine of apparent authority. 3
This Case Note proceeds in three parts. First, it reviews the concurrent
evolution of hospitals and accompanying public perception in the United
States, along with the development of vicarious liability theories both
generally and in Minnesota. 4 Second, the Note outlines Popovich, discusses
the court’s analysis and holdings, and reviews the dissent. 5 Third, the Note
concludes that the decision comports with the current health care climate,
explores the possible effects of the relaxed apparent authority standard, and
analyzes Popovich’s influence, including the potential for consideration of
a nondelegable duty standard in Minnesota. 6

1

Popovich v. Allina Health Sys., 946 N.W.2d 885, 895 (Minn. 2020).

2

Id. at 891–92.
Id. at 892–93.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.

3
4
5
6
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HISTORY

The gradual transformation of hospitals in the United States is a
testament to the commitment to caring for patients regardless of ability to
pay in unison with advancing medical technology and related costs. 7 The
modernization of hospitals into large corporations led to diminished
forbearance from pursuit of legal remedies by patients injured by physician
negligence. 8 As hospitals developed, their immunity dissolved, and courts
applied vicarious liability theories against hospitals for physician negligence. 9
Beginning with respondeat superior, courts later included agency theories
of agency by estoppel, apparent agency, and eventually, nondelegable duty. 10
Minnesota courts followed this general trajectory but were slower to apply
apparent authority than many other states. 11

A.

Evolution of Hospitals and Their Public Perception in the United
States

Before the rise of hospitals in the modern context, personal physicians
medically treated patients in their homes, if they could afford such care. 12
Those who could not afford in-house visits from personal physicians sought
charitable medical care at almshouses, 13 which were seen as a last resort and
often contained dire conditions. 14 Over time, almshouses slowly evolved into
hospitals. 15 Starting with the first hospital founded in the United States in the
mid-eighteenth century, hospitals initially remained charitable and focused
on educational medicine, stemming from the experimental background of

Hadley Hamilton, Note, Boren Ex. Rel. Boren v. Weeks and the Extension of Apparent
Agency Liability to Tennessee Hospitals for the Negligence of Independent Contractor
Physicians: Does the Fine Print Really Matter Anymore?, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENV’T
7

L. 257, 260–61 (2010).
Id. at 262.
8

Id.
Id. at 262–66; Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liability for
Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 438–57 (1996).
See infra Part II.C & Part III.
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 260 (citing Steven R. Owens, Note, Pamperin v. Trinity
Memorial Hospital and the Evolution of Hospital Liability: Wisconsin Adopts Apparent
Agency, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1129, 1131–34 (1990)).
Id. Almshouses were facilities supported by public and private donations that served to
care for indigent patients who had no means to receive medical care in their own home. Id.
at n.23 (citing Ruth E. Malone, Whither the Almshouse? Overutilization and the Role of the
Emergency Department, 23 HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 795, 798 (1998)).
Id. (citing JOINT COMM’N, HEALTH CARE AT THE CROSSROADS: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
9

10

11
12

13

14

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOSPITALS FOR THE FUTURE 6 (2008)). Physicians often evaluated
treatments by testing them on almshouse patients. Id. (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1131).
Id. (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1131).
15
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almshouses. 16
Hospitals began modernizing in the late nineteenth century as medical
science advanced. 17 These developments provided hospitals with
revolutionary equipment and techniques not readily accessible to private
physicians. 18 Coupled with technological and surgical innovations, the
evolution of transportation solidified hospitals’ accessibility and appeal to
the public for sophisticated, effective medical care. 19 Modern hospitals have
become dynamic facilities capable of providing comprehensive medical
treatment, shifting steadily away from their charitable roots to providing
premium medical care. 20 But this advanced level of care comes with a steep
price tag. 21
In step with the technological and methodological developments,
hospitals came to rely on paying clients to fund medical advancements and
for many, eventually turn a profit. 22 Hospitals began to compete with one
another for these patrons, touting their sophisticated services and
equipment to sway potential patients into choosing their medical care
facilities. 23 Now high-volume businesses, modern hospitals spend a sizeable
portion of their budgets on advertising to attract prospective clients not only

Id. at 260–61 (citing JOINT COMM’N, supra note 14, at 6) (“Over the next century, hospitals
became more closely aligned with medical education but still carried the air of ‘medical
experimentation’ that had been so closely associated with almshouses.”).
Id. at 261 (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1133).
Id. (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1134).
Id. (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1131, 1133) (“Railroads and automobiles provided the
public with a greater ability to travel than ever before. The hospital became a way for these
travelers to receive medical care if they happened to fall ill away from their homes and their
private doctors.”).
Id. (citing JOINT COMM’N, supra note 14, at 6); see infra note 23 (noting the correlation
between advertising and public perception).
Owens, supra note 12, at 1134 (“This new technology was expensive, and hospital trustees
increasingly placed more emphasis on attracting paying customers.”).
See id.; see also Hamilton, supra note 7, at 262–63 (“Advancing technology caused
hospitals [to] depend more on paying customers to help finance their activities. . . .
[H]ospitals continued to evolve into large for-profit institutions”); Howard Levin, Note,
16

17
18
19

20

21

22

Hospital Vicarious Liability for Negligence by Independent Contractor Physicians: A New
Rule for New Times, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1291, 1294–95 (2005) (“The modern health care
industry continues to distance itself from its charitable past and has experienced a significant
conversion from not-for-profit health care to for-profit hospital businesses.”).
See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 436 (“[T]he most important driver in the shift
in public perception has been hospitals’ marketing of themselves.”); see also Edwin L.
Barnes, Jr., Victims of Their Own Success? South Carolina Hospitals Now Have an
Absolute, Nondelegable Duty to Provide Competent Emergency Room Care, 50 S.C. L.
REV. 1063, 1064 (1999); Ryan Montefusco, Hospital Liability for the Right Reasons: A NonDelegable Duty to Provide Support Services, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1337, 1337–38 (2012)
(noting the undertaking of hospitals to distinguish themselves “has been marked by increased
self-advertising and overall commercialization of the industry”).
23
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for their specialized and elective services but also for emergency treatment. 24
These advertisements often boast of state-of-the-art equipment and
highly sought-after physicians and, as intended, induce potential patients to
rely on their marketing claims and choose their facilities in times of need
instead of other potential medical providers. 25 Nearly all modern hospitals
have long since abandoned their charitable roots and evolved into
conglomerates and brands, treating those who rely on their services as
consumers instead of patients. 26
Because the overarching messages of these advertising campaigns
aggrandize hospitals’ resources and treatment capabilities, the public has
come to expect a certain level of care. 27 The messaging not only promises
exceptional treatment but also describes hospitals as teams of exceedingly
capable professionals who work together to provide the utmost care. 28 These
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 316–17 (S.C. 2000) (“Like any
business dependent upon attracting individual people as customers, hospitals in the aggregate
spend billions to advertise their facilities and services in a variety of media, from newspapers
and billboards to television and the Internet.”); Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282
(Wis. 1992) (“[H]ospitals increasingly hold themselves out to the public in expensive
advertising campaigns as offering and rendering quality health care services. . . . Modern
hospitals have spent billions of dollars marketing themselves, nurturing the image with the
consuming public that they are full-care modern health facilities.”); see infra note 209 (citing
examples of current Minnesota hospital websites).
Kashishian, 481 N.W.2d at 282 (“All of these expenditures have but one purpose: to
persuade those in need of medical services to obtain those services at a specific hospital. In
essence, hospitals have become big business, competing with each other for health care
dollars.”); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Fam. Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994)
(“As an industry, hospitals spend enormous amounts of money advertising in an effort to
compete with each other for the health care dollar, thereby inducing the public to rely on
them in their time of medical need.”); Hamilton, supra note 7, at 257–58 (“The modern
hospital typically advertises itself as a multifaceted institution providing the public with the
best available healthcare through a vast array of specialty physicians and services.”).
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 257 (“Since their inception in the eighteenth century, hospitals
have evolved from charitable institutions providing care for the poor to large streamlined
corporations providing cutting edge medical care to those who can afford it. Hospitals have
become big business.”).
Id. at 293 (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1129) (“Often the advertisement portrays the
particular hospital as providing superlative care in some or all areas of medicine. These
modern advertising campaigns strive to portray a facility as a sort of brand name supplier of
medical care.”); Simmons, 533 S.E.2d at 321–22 (“Patients make those decisions based
primarily on the reputation of the hospital, which it often has aggressively promoted, and not
on the reputation of individual emergency room physicians.”); Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53
(“Public policy dictates that the public has every right to assume and expect that the hospital
is the medical provider it purports to be.”).
See supra note 25 (quoting Hamilton, supra note 7, at 257–58); see also Note, Theories
24

25

26

27

28

for Imposing Liability Upon Hospitals for Medical Malpractice: Ostensible Agency and
Corporate Liability, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 561, 561–62 (1985) (“Today's hospitals are
larger and more complex tha[n] ever before and operate as highly integrated systems utilizing
a team approach to medical care. Typically, many persons care for a patient. Consequently,
patients expect that treatment will be rendered by the hospital staff as a well-coordinated and
efficient unit.”) (citations omitted).
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portrayals lead reasonable community members to see hospitals not simply
as buildings housing equipment and providers, but as interwoven
organizations providing comprehensive care. 29

B.

Emergence of Vicarious Liability in Emergency Rooms

As hospitals evolved, so did their liability to patients for accidents and
incorrect diagnoses and treatments. 30 First, courts held hospitals liable for
employee physician negligence under respondeat superior. 31 Then, under
agency theory, courts found hospitals liable for negligent independent
contractor physicians. 32

1.

Respondeat Superior Supplants Charitable Immunity

When hospitals first emerged as the still-charitable offspring of
almshouses, judicial precedent generally protected hospitals from any
negligence liability using the doctrine of charitable immunity. 33 As hospitals
advanced in step with developments in medical technology, two concurrent
dependencies surfaced: hospitals became dependent on paying customers,
and society became dependent on hospitals for comprehensive medical
care. 34 Charitable immunity could no longer shield hospitals from liability as
hospitals cared for increasing numbers of patients from the middle and
upper classes who paid for their own medical care. 35
Without charitable immunity, hospitals were held liable for their
employees’ negligent actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a

“The simple fact of the matter is that ‘[t]he modern hospital has evolved into a corporate
institution assuming “the role of a comprehensive health center ultimately responsible for
arranging and coordinating total health care.”’ Gone are the days when hospitals were simply
buildings where doctors came to treat patients.” R. Edwin Lamberth, Establishing Hospital
Liability for Physician Negligence, 21 ALA. ASS'N JUST. J. 33, 33 (2001) (quoting J. Douglas
Peters, Hospital Malpractice: Ten Theories of Direct Liability, 12 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 254,
254 (1984)). See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 258 (“By holding itself out as providing all
manner of medical care to the public, the modern hospital has blurred the line between
simply being a building where physicians practice medicine and being the entity providing
that actual medical care.”).
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 258 (“Modern jurisprudence is also evolving to keep pace with
the evolution of hospitals. Where hospitals were once shielded from liability on the basis of
charitable immunity they now find themselves on the frontline of increasing liability to the
patients they serve.”).
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263–66.
Id. at 261–62 (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1132–33); Elizabeth Isbey, Note, Diggs v.
Novant Health, Inc. and the Emergence of Hospital Liability for Negligent IndependentContractor Physicians in North Carolina, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2008).
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 262 (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1134). Hospitals began to
rely on paying customers to finance the newest technology and equipment. Id.
29

30

31
32
33

34

35

Id.
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well-known principle of vicarious liability. 36 Because respondeat superior
requires an employer-employee relationship, courts initially refused to hold
hospitals vicariously liable for negligent independent contractors. 37

2.

Brief Categorization of Agency Theories Applied to Hospitals

As hospitals evolved, courts eventually used agency principles to hold
hospitals liable even when the physicians were not technically employees. 38
The two most common agency theories in the United States are agency by
estoppel and apparent agency. 39 Although sometimes mistakenly used
interchangeably, these two theories are founded in separate principles. 40
While there is some deviation in the standards used, these theories have
been widely applied to hospital emergency rooms for decades. 41 A third
theory emerging more recently in hospital liability is the more stringent
nondelegable duty doctrine. 42

a.

Agency by Estoppel

Rooted in agency principles, agency by estoppel is an equitable
doctrine requiring that a plaintiff justifiably relied to his detriment on the
care of a negligent independent contractor who was held out by a hospital
as an agent. 43 The doctrine is applied to prevent a party from taking
advantage of another party who reasonably relied on the first party’s
actions. 44 When applied to hospital liability, plaintiffs usually must establish:
Id. (citing Levin, supra note 22, at 1294–95). “An employer is subject to liability for torts
committed while acting within the scope of their employment.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 2.04 (Am. L. Inst. 2006). Rationales behind the theory of respondeat superior
include that it incentivizes employers to prevent accidents, assures monetary compensation
for the injured party, and equitably distributes the financial losses among the parties who
directly benefit from the activity that caused the accident. Hamilton, supra note 7, at 263
(citing Rhett B. Franklin, Comment, Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle: A
Recommendation for Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior,
39 S.D. L. REV. 570, 577 (1994)).
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 263 (citing Isbey, supra note 33, at 1131).
36

37
38
39
40

Id.
Id. (citing Levin, supra note 22, at 1295).
Id.; see Isbey, supra note 33, at 1136 n.50 (“Many courts fail to distinguish between these

two theories and instead rely on a combination of the different requirements of each
doctrine.”); Levin, supra note 22, at 1295 (“These doctrines of liability have significant
substantive differences. Commentators criticize state courts for using these names
interchangeably and confusing the underlying legal theories which are based on either agency
or tort law.”).
Popovich v. Allina Health Sys., 946 N.W.2d 885, 893 n.8 (Minn. 2020).
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 452.
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 263–64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267, cmt.
a (Am. L. Inst. 1958)). The mere belief that the physician was an employee is not enough to
create liability in the hospital. Id. The plaintiff’s detrimental reliance must be reasonable. Id.
at 264 n.62 (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1142 n.58).
Isbey, supra note 33, at 1135–36.
41
42
43

44
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(1) the hospital held out the negligent physician as an agent or employee;
and (2) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the hospital’s representation. 45
The element setting this theory apart is the stricter reliance
requirement, often referred to as detrimental reliance. 46 The patient must
show reliance on the hospital holding itself out as the employer of the
physician and that treatment would have been refused if the patient knew
the physician was not an employee. 47 The patient must also show the
reliance was justified or reasonable. 48 Some state courts even require the
patient to show the hospital acted in bad faith in its misrepresentations. 49
While many states applied this doctrine at one time, or still do, other states
apply the more accessible theory of apparent or ostensible agency. 50

b.

Apparent or Ostensible Agency

Apparent agency (otherwise referred to as apparent authority in
Minnesota) is a tort-based doctrine with nearly the same elements as agency
by estoppel but does not require the plaintiff to establish the more stringent
element of detrimental reliance. 51 In the hospital setting, a plaintiff must
prove the medical services were accepted based on the belief that the
hospital or its employees were providing those services. 52
Here, the patient’s reliance on the hospital’s representation of the
relationship must still be reasonable, but the patient typically does not need
to prove the services would have been refused if the patient had known the
physician was an independent contractor. 53 There have been discrepancies
45
46

Hamilton, supra note 7, at 264 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267).
Id. (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1142 n.58); Isbey, supra note 33, at 1136–37 (“[U]nlike

apparent agency, agency by estoppel requires both reliance and a change in position by the
patient based on the representations of the hospital as the alleged employer of the
independent contractor.”).
Isbey, supra note 33, at 1137.
Id.; see, e.g., Mehlman v. Powell, 378 A.2d 1121, 1123–24 (Md. 1977) (discussing
examples of both reasonable and unjustified reliance).
Isbey, supra note 33, at 1137. Usually, bad faith misrepresentation must be proven by
showing a misrepresentation of fact by the hospital or silence where the hospital knows the
patient will misconstrue it. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 448.
See Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 322–23 (S.C. 2000) (citing cases
relying on section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); see also Isbey, supra note 33,
at 1133 (“Courts look at a variety of factors in determining whether the hospital held itself
out as employing one of these types of physicians. This is a low standard, designed to assist
the patient in proving the apparent agency relationship existed between the hospital and the
physician.”).
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 264 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (Am. L.
Inst. 1965)). Apparent agency is also referred to as apparent authority in Minnesota.
Popovich v. Allina Health Sys., 946 N.W.2d 885, 890 n.4 (Minn. 2020).
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 264–65 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429).
Isbey, supra note 33, at 1137 (stating that section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
only requires the patient to “show that the hospital held itself out as a provider of medical
care,” as opposed to the requirements of section 267).
47
48

49

50

51

52
53
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among the courts as to whether the patient’s reliance should be measured
on an objective or subjective basis. 54 The holding out element is generally
less stringent under this theory as well; 55 a hospital’s advertisements may be
enough to show it held its physicians out as employees. 56 Even further, some
jurisdictions held patients could properly assume emergency room
physicians were employees of the hospital unless notice was provided to the
contrary. 57
Over the years, courts increasingly lowered the requirements of
apparent agency in favor of patients seeking to hold hospitals liable for
independent contractor physicians. 58 This idea is seen where at least one
court agreed with the proposition that patients have the right, absent notice
to the contrary, to assume emergency room treatments are being rendered
by hospital employees and that the hospital will be held responsible for any
negligence in that treatment. 59 Such interpretations of apparent agency
pushed the doctrine closer to a nondelegable duty standard. 60

c.

Nondelegable Duty
A few courts bypassed agency by estoppel and apparent agency and

Levin, supra note 22, at 1291–92 (“[C]ourts in Illinois imposed divergent reliance
standards. . . . As a result, vicarious liability of hospitals under the doctrine of apparent
authority has developed into a confusing and unpredictable area of law in Illinois. Other
states have also struggled with the reliance requirement of independent contractor vicarious
liability for hospitals.”).
Isbey, supra note 33, at 1133 (“This is a low standard, designed to assist the patient. . . .
Typically, if the hospital held itself out to the patient such that the patient would look to the
hospital and not to the individual independent-contractor physician for care, then a court
would find this condition satisfied.”).
See Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 856 (Wis. 1988) (noting many
courts found that by providing emergency room care to patients who were not advised they
were being treated by the hospital’s agent, hospitals create an appearance that the hospital’s
employees will provide care as opposed to an independent contractor).
See id. at 856–57 (making its own rule after citing Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d
450, 453 (1976)) (“[I]f Pamperin proves that Trinity held itself out as a provider of emergency
room care without informing Pamperin that the care was provided by independent
contractors, Pamperin has satisfied the first requirement for proving liability under the
doctrine of apparent authority.”).
See Isbey, supra note 33, at 1133–34 (stating the first factor “can be satisfied merely by
demonstrating that the hospital held itself out as a complete provider of medical care to the
public,” and the second factor “presumes the patient’s actual reliance when he enters the
hospital and comes under the care of a physician whom he believes to be an employee of
the hospital.”).
See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 460 (discussing Fulton v. Quinn, C.A. 89CAU-36, 1993 WL 19674 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 1993) (mem.)).
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 320–21 (S.C. 2000) (“Most courts
applying the apparent agency doctrine in the emergency room setting have relaxed those
requirements substantially in order to hold the hospital liable. . . . Consequently, we believe
the better solution, grounded primarily in public policy reasons . . . is to impose a
nondelegable duty on hospitals.”).
54

55

56

57

58

59

60
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applied a nondelegable duty theory, holding hospitals responsible for the
care provided by their emergency room physicians, regardless of their
employment arrangements. 61 This vicarious liability theory imposes liability
on the delegating party regardless of fault. 62 One policy behind this doctrine
is that certain responsibilities to the community are too important to allow
a party to transfer liability. 63 In practice, the nondelegable piece is liability; a
hospital may delegate its duty to an independent contractor, but the hospital
will remain liable to any third party for negligence of the delegatee. 64 Some
courts found hospitals owe patients a direct and nondelegable duty to
provide non-negligent care in their emergency rooms. 65
This liability stems from statutes, regulations, contracts, and common
66
law. A common law nondelegable duty typically arises out of an “inherently
dangerous activit[y].” 67 Although emergency room care is not widely
considered inherently dangerous, some argue for that designation. 68
However, because it is not commonly viewed as dangerous, this application
is less likely in the hospital setting. 69
The most common bases for this type of liability are statutory or
contractual. 70 Many states have statutes and regulations that impose a
minimum standard of care on health care providers. 71 This minimum
standard of care has been used in some cases to impose a nondelegable duty
See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 454; see also Simmons, 533 S.E.2d at 318–
19 (implementing nondelegable duty doctrine in hospitals and referencing other states who
already do so).
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 453.
Barnes, supra note 23, at 1069 (citing W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton
& David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at § 71, at 511–12 (5th ed.
1984)) (“It is difficult to suggest any criterion by which the non-delegable character of such
duties may be determined, other than the conclusion of the courts that the responsibility is
so important to the community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to
another.”).
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 452.
See Simmons, 533 S.E.2d at 318–19 (“Alaska, Florida, and New York courts have applied
the nondelegable duty doctrine to care provided by a hospital's emergency room
physicians.”).
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 453 (citing Keeton, supra note 63, at § 71, at 511).
Id. at 453 n.117.
Id. at 456–57 n.141.
61

62
63

64
65

66
67
68
69

Id.

David G. Wirtes, Jr. & George M. Dent, III, Hospitals’, Surgical Centers’, and Clinics’
Vicarious Liability for Acts and Omissions of Doctors, CRNAs, Physician’s Assistants, and
Nurses, 31 ALA. ASS’N JUST. J. 44, 48–49 (2012).
See e.g., id. at 49 (“A hospital’s nondelegable duty to provide competent medical care may
70

71

arise from one or more of the following: (1) regulations imposed upon all hospitals which
are recipients of federal funding under Medicare/Medicaid; (2) the fact that the hospital
voluntarily undertook to provide emergency medical care to the patient; and (3) the fact that

the Alabama Legislature has imposed a minimum standard of care upon all health care
providers who operate in this State pursuant to Ala. Code § 65584(a) (1975).”) (emphasis
added).
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on hospitals to provide a certain level of care. 72 On a contractual basis,
hospitals may be subject to a nondelegable duty expressly based on certain
admittance or authorization forms to provide treatment, as well as impliedly
based on voluntarily undertaking to provide medical services. 73
While the nondelegable duty theory has been around since at least the
early nineteenth century in other contexts, 74 most courts have been reluctant
so far to take the extra step toward what would practically be strict liability
of hospitals for negligent physicians, especially in emergency rooms. 75
However, the courts that decided to impose a nondelegable duty on
hospitals bolstered these decisions with strong public policy arguments that
could eventually sway more courts into joining in this application. 76 Although
apparent agency is the current theory applicable to hospitals with
independent contractors in most states, including the recent addition of
Minnesota, 77 several states have taken the liability a step further, finding
hospitals have a nondelegable duty to provide a minimum standard of care
in emergency rooms. 78

C.

Vicarious Liability in Minnesota

Vicarious liability has been applied in Minnesota since at least the late
nineteenth century. 79 With the court’s latest decision in Popovich,
Minnesota now recognizes two pertinent theories of vicarious liability
relating to hospitals: respondeat superior and apparent authority. 80
Throughout its application of apparent authority, Minnesota kept its

See Wax v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“We
conclude that because the statute and regulation impose this duty for non-negligent
anesthesia services on all surgical hospitals, it is important enough that as between the
hospital and its patient it should be deemed non-delegable without the patient's express
consent.”).
See, e.g., id. at 9–11. Here, the patient only consented to administering anesthesia services
under the admission form, and the language in the form could not be “construed to stand as
an agreement to discharge the hospital from its primary statutory and contractual duty of
providing non-negligent anesthesia services.” Id. Had negligence been addressed in the
provision, “the Hospital would be liable as a matter of law.” Id. at 11.
See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 452–53.
See Wirtes & Dent, supra note 70, at 49 (“A hospital that provides a full service emergency
medical facility that is open to the public has a duty to provide such services within the
standard of care.”).
See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 452–55; see, e.g., supra notes 60, 63, and
accompanying text (referencing policy arguments); infra Part IV.B.2. & Part IV.C.2
(addressing the ways these policy arguments could sway additional courts).
Popovich v. Allina Health Sys., 946 N.W.2d 885, 892–93 n.8 (Minn. 2020).
See supra note 76.
See Rait v. New Eng. Furniture & Carpet Co., 66 Minn. 76, 78, 68 N.W. 729, 730 (1896);
Gahagan v. Aerometer Co., 67 Minn. 252, 255, 69 N.W. 914, 915 (1897).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 890. The Minnesota Supreme Court uses the terms apparent
authority and apparent agency interchangeably. Id. at 890 n.4.
72

73

74
75

76

77
78
79

80
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reliance standard fairly consistent. 81

1.

Respondeat Superior and Apparent Authority

Respondeat superior holds an employer vicariously liable for its
employee’s negligence while working. 82 Apparent authority holds a principal
vicariously liable for holding an agent out “as having authority” or
“knowingly” allowing the agent to act for the principal when the agent is
negligent. 83 In addition to the requirement of holding an agent out as having
authority, Minnesota courts also established a second requirement of
reliance. 84 Ultimately, the principal’s conduct, rather than the agent’s,
provides proof of apparent authority. 85
Minnesota courts have long applied the theory of respondeat superior
to hold hospitals vicariously liable for negligent employees. 86 Minnesota
precedent requires an employer to retain a chain of control over an
employee’s actions. 87 The court pointed out the notable difference between
respondeat superior and apparent authority: the latter does not require an
element of control. 88 Under apparent authority in Minnesota, a principal
does not need to have control over a non-employee to be held vicariously
liable for the non-employee’s negligence. 89 Before Popovich, the Minnesota
81
82

See infra Part II.C.2 (outlining marginal variations to the reliance standard).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 890 (citing Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Minn.

1988)).
Id. at 890–91 (quoting Hockemeyer v. Pooler, 268 Minn. 551, 562, 130 N.W.2d 367, 375
(1964) (“The principal must have held the agent out as having authority, or must have
knowingly permitted the agent to act on its behalf; furthermore, the party dealing with the
agent must have actual knowledge that the agent was held out by the principal as having such
authority or had been permitted by the principal to act on its behalf; and the proof of the
agent's apparent authority must be found in the conduct of the principal, not the agent.”).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 895. The argument behind the reliance element is when a person
interacts with an agent, that person must reasonably and diligently attempt to verify whether
the agent has authority to act as requested or intended in the interaction. See Truck Crane
Serv. Co. v. Barr-Nelson, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1983).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 891 (citing Hockemeyer at 562, 130 N.W.2d at 375).
Id. This was already a well-established principle in Minnesota by 1942. See St. PaulMercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 559–60, 4 N.W.2d 637, 638
(1942).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 891; see St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 212 Minn. at 558–61, 4
N.W.2d at 638–39; Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 375–82, 54 N.W.2d 639, 644–46
(1952) (affirming the rule requiring a continuous chain of control).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 891 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. a,
c (Am. L. Inst. 1958)).
Id. Control was not necessary as long as the principal “held the non-employee out as having
authority or knowingly permitted the non-employee to assume authority.” Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 2006)). “‘Apparent authority
holds a principal accountable for the results of third-party beliefs about an actor's authority
to act as an agent when the belief is reasonable and is traceable to a manifestation of the
83

84

85
86

87

88

89
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Supreme Court had not yet considered whether apparent authority applied
to hospitals for the negligence of emergency room non-employees. 90

2.

Variations in Minnesota’s Apparent Authority Reliance Requirement

The doctrine of apparent authority has been applied in Minnesota
since at least the mid-1960s. 91 Under this theory, a business may be held
vicariously liable for a non-employee’s negligence, even if the business has
no control over the non-employee, if the business holds out the nonemployee as having authority or knowingly permits the non-employee to
assume authority. 92 The element of control necessary to respondeat superior
is irrelevant to a finding of apparent authority. 93 A plaintiff seeking to hold a
business liable under an apparent authority theory must prove two elements:
holding out and reliance. 94
While holding out is still a required element, the Popovich decision
focuses heavily on the reliance standard; 95 this Note will follow suit. The
Minnesota Supreme Court established the standard for apparent authority
in Hockemeyer v. Pooler, providing in relevant part that “the party dealing
with the agent must have actual knowledge that the agent was held out by
the principal as having such authority or had been permitted by the principal
to act on its behalf.” 96 This “actual knowledge” reliance standard was cited
in other early cases applying apparent authority in Minnesota. 97
The courts in these early cases interpreted reliance to require a plaintiff
principal.’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c). Non-employee
and independent contractor are meant to be used interchangeably throughout this Note, and
non-employee is used here specifically in relation to the Minnesota courts’ use of the term.
See, e.g., id. (using the term non-employee).
Id. at 890. Although the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered vicarious liability against
a hospital for the alleged malpractice of a non-employee in a hospital’s emergency room in
its McElwain decision, the court did not specifically refer to either respondeat superior or
apparent authority when it decided the hospital could not be held vicariously liable. Id. at
891 (referring to McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)). See
Kramer v. St. Cloud Hosp., No. A11-1187, 2012 WL 360415, at *13–14 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 6, 2012) (Minge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting McElwain
addressed vicarious liability, but “no reported Minnesota court decision has addressed the
issue of the apparent authority of a hospital for the actions of a separately employed
physician”).
See Hockemeyer v. Pooler, 268 Minn. 551, 562, 130 N.W.2d 367, 375 (1964); Lindstrom
v. Minn. Liquid Fertilizer Co., 264 Minn. 485, 119 N.W.2d 855 (1963).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 891.
Id. at 891–92.
Id. at 895 (citing Hockemeyer, 268 Minn. at 562, 130 N.W.2d at 375; Foley v. Allard, 427
N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. 1988)).
See id. at 895–97.
Hockemeyer, 268 Minn. at 562, 130 N.W.2d at 375.
Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. 1988) (citing Hockemeyer, 268 Minn. at
562, 130 N.W.2d at 375); Truck Crane Serv. Co. v. Barr-Nelson, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 824,
826 (Minn. 1983) (citing Hockemeyer, 268 Minn. at 562, 130 N.W.2d at 375).
90

91

92
93
94

95
96
97
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to be aware of the principal’s representations of authority. 98 While
Minnesota courts have interpreted the reliance or knowledge element with
slight variation depending on the circumstances, 99 they have never applied a
“but-for” test to establish reliance. 100 A “but-for” reliance would mean a
plaintiff must show the services of the non-employee would not have been
accepted had the plaintiff known the non-employee was not an actual agent
of the business. 101 This precedent becomes imperative in the court’s
application of apparent authority to hospital emergency room dynamics in
Popovich. 102
III.

THE POPOVICH DECISION

Alla Popovich brought a medical malpractice action on behalf of her
husband, Aleksandr Popovich (“Popovich”), against Allina Health System
as the owner and operator of two hospitals where Popovich received
allegedly negligent emergency room medical care. 103 First, an outline of the
facts provides context for the decision. 104 Then, the court provides reasoning
and analysis relating to precedent. 105 Finally, the dissent discusses the logical
progression from the court’s applied standard. 106

See Truck Crane Serv. Co., 329 N.W.2d at 827 (quoting Duluth Herald & News Trib. v.
Plymouth Optical Co., 286 Minn. 495, 498–99, 176 N.W.2d 552, 555 (1970)) (“Apparent
authority ‘exists only as to those third persons who learn of the manifestation from words or
conduct for which the principal is responsible.’”).
See id. at 826–27 n.1 (discussing the circumstances of the present matter as compared to a
distinguishable set of circumstances in a previous matter).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 895, n.16 (“Our precedent does not describe an actual reliance
standard whereby a plaintiff must show that certain actions would not have been taken but
for the appearance of an agent’s authority.”).
See id. at 895 (“Actual reliance, as explained by Allina, would mean that a plaintiff’s claim
fails unless the plaintiff can show that the patient would not have accepted care had the
patient known that the personnel in the emergency room were not actually agents or
employees of the hospital.”). “The Ohio Supreme Court initially adopted the type of ‘but
for’ reliance standard that Allina asks us to apply here.” Id. at 896 (citing Albain v. Flower
Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049–50 (1990)).
See id. at 895–97.
Id. at 888. Alla Popovich is Aleksandr Popovich’s wife and guardian ad litem. Id. Allina
Health System owns and operates both Unity Hospital and Mercy Hospital. Id.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
98

99

100

101

102
103

104
105
106
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Facts and Procedural Posture

On February 9, 2016, Popovich went to Unity Hospital’s emergency
room with dizziness and trouble breathing. 107 A physician ordered a CT scan
of Popovich’s head, and Popovich returned home after about two hours. 108
Later that morning, Popovich became unresponsive and went to Mercy
Hospital’s emergency room where a physician ordered a second CT scan. 109
A radiologist reviewed both CT scans and noted increased swelling in
Popovich’s brain since the first CT scan. 110 Popovich was later transferred to
Abbott Northwestern Hospital for further care. 111 Doctors at Abbott found
Popovich suffered a stroke, which left him with irreversible brain damage. 112
Popovich sued Allina and several other parties, alleging he would not
have suffered such debilitating injuries if the emergency room doctors and
first radiologist had diagnosed and treated his stroke symptoms earlier. 113
The doctors and radiologists in the Unity and Mercy Hospital emergency
rooms were not employees of the hospitals but were instead employees of
Emergency Physicians Professional Association (“EPPA”). 114 EPPA
provided doctors for emergency rooms in Allina’s facilities under contract. 115
The complaint against Allina asserted Allina was vicariously liable for its
non-employee radiologist and doctors under the doctrine of apparent
authority. 116
Allina moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the complaint did not
state a proper claim because Minnesota did not allow suits against hospitals
for independent contractor negligence. 117 Relying on the Minnesota Court
of Appeals’ decision in McElwain v. Van Beek, 118 the district court granted

Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 888.
Id. The CT scan was reviewed by a radiologist. Id.
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id.
Id. Popovich’s official diagnosis was “dissection of the left proximal vertebral artery with
thrombus.” Id. Popovich’s permanent symptoms included the inability to walk without
107
108
109
110
111
112

assistance, very little use of his right arm and leg, and severe cognitive impairments, including
speech. Id. Popovich will need nursing care for the remainder of his life for his permanent
disabilities. Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. Suburban Radiologic Consultants employed the radiologists, who were provided to
Allina emergency rooms under a similar contract arrangement as EPPA. Id.
Id.
Id. Allina moved to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Id.
447 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see infra Part III.B.1 (explaining how the
Minnesota Supreme Court later clarified the McElwain decision).
113
114
115

116
117

118
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Allina’s motion. 119 Popovich appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the district court’s dismissal in a divided decision. 120 The
court of appeals agreed with the district court that McElwain barred
Popovich’s vicarious liability claim against Allina. 121 The dissent argued
McElwain had not properly established a rule regarding apparent authority—
contrary to the majority’s conclusion. 122 The Minnesota Supreme Court
granted Popovich’s petition for review. 123

B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision
and remanded to the district court, holding a plaintiff may state a claim
under the theory of apparent authority against a hospital for the negligence
of emergency room independent contractors. 124 The court briefly reviewed
vicarious liability precedent in Minnesota, noting the differences between
the two vicarious liability theories of respondeat superior and apparent
authority, then began its full analysis. 125 First, the court explained how the
court of appeals’ McElwain decision conflated the two theories. 126 Next, the
court reasoned why hospitals should not be exempt from apparent
authority. 127 Lastly, the court outlined the legal standard for applying
apparent authority to hospitals for negligent independent contractor
physicians. 128

Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 889–90.
Id. at 890 (citing Popovich v. Allina Health Sys. (Popovich Appeal), No. A18-1987, 2019
WL 3000755, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 8, 2019), aff’g No. 27-CV-18-10905, 2018 WL
9785370 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2018), rev’d, 946 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2020)).
Id. (citing Popovich Appeal, 2019 WL 3000755, at *3).
Id. (citing Popovich Appeal, 2019 WL 3000755, at *6 (Ross, J., dissenting)) (“Minnesota

119
120

121
122

has never properly established any rule categorically immunizing hospitals from vicarious
liability premised on the tortfeasor’s apparent authority to act for the institution.”).
123
124

Id.
Id. at 898. On remand, Popovich settled with Allina. See Findings of Fact and Ord.

Dismissing Defendant Allina Health Sys. Without Prejudice at 2, Popovich v. Allina Health
Sys., No. 27-CV-18-10905, (Minn. Dist. Ct. dismissed Oct. 4, 2021). In the settlement, Allina
agreed Popovich could re-assert a claim against Allina in the future. Id. (“Allina has agreed
that Plaintiffs may re-assert their Apparent Authority Claim against Allina if Plaintiffs obtain
a jury verdict and subsequent judgment in their favor against the remaining Defendants and
are not able to collect the total amount of the judgment from the remaining Defendants or
their liability insurers.”).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 890–91; see supra Part II.C.1 (reviewing precedent in more
detail).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 892 (stating control is irrelevant to an apparent authority claim);
see infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
125

126

127
128
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McElwain’s Conflation of Vicarious Liability Theories

In McElwain v. Van Beek, 129 an emergency room visitor sued a
physician and medical center for injuries she suffered when she fainted
while her brother received emergency treatment. 130 In relevant part, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals decided only that the lower court did not err
in dismissing the plaintiff’s action against the medical center. 131 The court
stated an earlier decision in Moeller v. Hauser 132 stood for the proposition
that “[i]n Minnesota, a hospital can only be held vicariously liable for a
physician’s acts if the physician is an employee of the hospital.” 133 However,
this was not a proposition the court made in Moeller. 134 Instead, the court
stated, “It is well established in this state that a hospital, private or charitable,
is liable to a patient for the torts of its employes [sic] under the doctrine of
Respondeat superior.” 135 The Moeller court did not propose that
respondeat superior was the only theory of vicarious liability that could hold
a hospital liable to patients for the negligence of physicians. 136
The McElwain decision did not spend much time on the issue of the
medical center’s liability, disposing of the issue quickly by misstating what
Moeller stood for. 137 The court found that because the physician was an
independent contractor, the medical center was relieved of any liability. 138
The court failed to consider other theories of vicarious liability in its cursory
dismissal based on respondeat superior. 139 By this time, Minnesota courts
had been applying the theory of apparent authority to many other

129

447 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).

130

Id. at 444.
Id. at 447. The court did not believe the medical center had independent liability and

131

noted the appellant’s complaint did not allege independent liability against the medical
center. Id. The court also noted that without a cause of action for independent liability, the
medical center could not be found liable if the physician is not liable. Id.
237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952).
McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 446 (emphasis added) (citing Moeller, 237 Minn. at 378–79,
54 N.W.2d at 645–46). In Moeller, a father sued a hospital and its doctors for an injury to
his son’s foot, sustained while his son was being treated at the hospital. Moeller, 237 Minn.
at 370–71, 54 N.W.2d at 641.
See Moeller, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639.
Id. at 645 (citing St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 4
N.W.2d 637 (Minn. 1942)).
See Moeller, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W. 2d 639; see also Popovich v. Allina Health Sys.,
946 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn. 2020) (discussing the McElwain court’s improper use of
Moeller to support its proposition that an employment relationship is necessary for vicarious
liability).
See McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 446; supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 446.
See id. at 446–47.
132
133

134
135

136

137
138
139
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circumstances, 140 and the McElwain court missed an opportunity to address
its potential applicability to hospitals in that case. 141

2.

Apparent Authority Applies to Hospitals

Next, the court analyzed, as a matter of first impression, whether
hospitals should be exempt from vicarious liability for the negligence of
independent contractors under the theory of apparent authority. 142 First, the
court rejected Allina’s policy argument that “patients already have sufficient
remedies for medical malpractice” 143 and offered its own policy argument:
apparent authority prevents “secret limitations” from being placed on
“liability to third persons” for an agent’s acts or omissions. 144 The court also
suggested methods for hospitals to address additional risks. 145
Furthermore, the court noted the public is often unaware of hospitals’
arrangements with emergency room physicians, stating that allowing
hospitals to evade vicarious liability because of these undetected
independent contractor agreements would contradict the purpose of
apparent authority. 146 The court found no reason to grant an exemption to
hospitals and held plaintiffs may assert apparent authority claims for
140

See supra Part II.C (noting application of apparent authority in Minnesota started in the

1960s).

Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 891 (referring to McElwain, 447 N.W.2d 442) (“The court of
appeals conflated the two theories of vicarious liability and cited Moeller for a holding we
never made—that an employment relationship between a hospital and physician is a necessary
condition for vicarious liability. McElwain’s reliance on Moeller as support for this
proposition was therefore incorrect.”).
Id. at 890–95.
Id. at 892 (“The existence of other remedies does not justify granting a hospitals-only
exemption from the general rule of vicarious liability based on apparent authority.”).
Id. at 894 (quoting Lindstrom v. Minn. Liquid Fertilizer Co., 264 Minn. 485, 496, 119
N.W.2d 855, 862 (1963)).
Id. at 893–94. Hospitals can monitor the care provided in their facilities and allocate risks
through their independent contractor agreements (likely through indemnification clauses).
141

142
143

144

145

Id.
Nonemployee physicians providing medical services in the hospital have a
contractual relationship with the hospital. As such, the parties are free to make any
agreement they wish between themselves. In addition to its common law right to
indemnification when held vicariously liable, the hospital can provide in its
nonemployee physician contracts that the physician will defend, indemnify and
hold the hospital harmless from all claims and liabilities resulting from the
physician’s negligence.

Id. at 894 n.11 (quoting John Dwight Ingram, Liability of Medical Institutions for the
Negligence of Independent Contractors Practicing on Their Premises, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 221, 229 (1993)).
Id. at 894 (“It would be contrary to the fundamental purpose of the apparent authority
doctrine to allow hospital systems to escape vicarious liability for the negligence of
independent contractors working in emergency rooms through these little-known contractual
relationships, even as hospitals reap both reputational and financial benefits.”).
146
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vicarious liability against hospitals for non-employees’ negligent acts. 147

3.
Legal Standard for Applying Apparent Authority to Emergency
Rooms
Finally, after confirming apparent authority doctrine encompassed
hospitals, the court debated which legal standard applies to cases alleging
medical malpractice by non-employees in hospital emergency rooms. 148 The
court began by distinguishing apparent authority from actual authority. 149
Then, it provided the two requirements for an apparent authority claim: (1)
the principal “held the agent out as having authority” or “knowingly
permitted the agent to act on its behalf,” 150 and (2) the plaintiff was aware of
the principal’s representations of the agent’s authority and relied on them. 151
The court ultimately modified this standard to apply to apparent authority
claims against hospitals for emergency room independent contractors. 152
As to the first requirement, the court noted the focus should be on the
hospitals’ representations to the public because modern health care facilities
are run like businesses, and hospitals competitively advertise so the public
will choose them for their medical needs. 153 The court dedicated the
remainder of its analysis on the reliance requirement. 154 Allina argued for an
actual reliance standard, 155 but the court asserted precedent in other
apparent authority matters did not use actual reliance. 156 Instead, it decided
to explore other jurisdictions for guidance in hospital emergency room
settings. 157 The Ohio Supreme Court had an initial standard of actual or
“but-for” reliance, which the court found too strict. 158 Consequently, it was
rejected in favor of a standard requiring only that a patient look to a hospital
to provide medical care instead of an individual physician. 159
147
148
149

Id. at 894–95.
Id. at 895.
Id. (quoting Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Minn. 1997))

(“Apparent authority ‘is not actual authority; rather it is authority which the principal holds
the agent out as possessing or knowingly permits the agent to assume.’”).
Id. (quoting Hockemeyer v. Pooler, 268 Minn. 551, 562, 130 N.W.2d 367, 375 (1964)).

150

Id.
See id. at 898.
Id. at 897.
See id. at 895–97.
Id. at 895. According to Allina, actual reliance would mean a plaintiff must show he would
not have accepted care if he had known the physicians were not employees. Id.
Id.
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id. The court rejected Albain’s “but for” standard because it “force[d] the emergency
151
152
153
154
155

156
157
158
159

patient to demonstrate that she would have chosen to risk further complications or death
rather than be treated by a physician of whose independence she had been unaware.” Id.
See Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049–50 (Ohio 1990); Clark v. Southview
Hosp. & Fam. Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ohio 1994) (showing the short time between
Albain’s “but-for” reliance standard to Clark’s lower standard).
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Pointing to Ohio’s relatively quick abandonment of “but-for” reliance,
the Minnesota Supreme Court declined actual reliance for Minnesota’s
standard. 160 The court argued the reliance element should focus on the
patient’s beliefs and determine whether the patient relied on the hospital to
select a physician to perform the necessary medical care. 161 The final rule
adopted by the court required two elements to bring a claim for vicarious
liability under the theory of apparent authority against a hospital for a
negligent emergency room independent contractor. 162 A plaintiff must show:
“(1) the hospital held itself out as a provider of emergency medical care; and
(2) the patient looked to the hospital, rather than a specific doctor, for care
and relied on the hospital to select the personnel to provide services.” 163

C.

Dissent Likens Application of Majority’s Decision to Strict Liability

In his dissent, Justice G. Barry Anderson categorized the issue in
164
According to Justice
Anderson, the new rule issued by the majority was “inconsistent with the
longstanding common law of Minnesota,” and the rule’s reliance
requirement is “unworkable.” 165 Justice Anderson wrote medical facilities
and hospitals were not comparable to other Minnesota businesses, and
therefore, apparent authority should not be extended to health care. 166 The
dissent suggested that since the state and national legislatures heavily
regulate hospitals but had not prohibited independent contractor
physicians, the court should not use the common law to expand hospital
liability. 167
Justice Anderson argued the reliance requirement fit poorly in the
hospital setting. 168 Accordingly, he said, apparent authority should not be
imposed on hospitals. 169 The dissent noted application of apparent authority
primarily hinges on the reliance element. 170 While Justice Anderson
conceded emergency room patients may believe the hospital provides
services or considers physicians employees, actual reliance should be

Popovich as “a pure question of public policy.”

160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 896–97.
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 899 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 900. Justice Anderson framed the rule as extending apparent authority to hospitals

in contrast with the majority’s argument that declining to apply the rule to medical care would
be an exception to an otherwise indiscriminately applied principle. Id.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 900 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 901.
167
168
169
170

Id.
Id. “[A]uthority by holding out is of no importance until a third party relies thereon.” Id.

(quoting Schlick v. Berg, 205 Minn. 465, 468, 286 N.W. 356, 358 (1939)).
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required if apparent authority was applied to hospitals. 171 The dissent posited
the subjective nature of the majority’s reliance requirement, coupled with a
loose understanding of what it means for a hospital to hold itself out, would
leave hospitals with no effective way to disprove a patient’s beliefs—
effectively making the application one of “strict liability or a close relative of
strict liability.” 172
Justice Anderson may not be entirely off base. The application of
apparent authority to hospitals, as outlined by the majority, leaves little room
for hospitals to mitigate liability. 173 It remains to be seen whether the
majority’s suggestions for risk minimization to hospitals will be effective. 174
If the court’s new rule is as close to strict liability as the dissent argues, the
leap to a nondelegable duty standard may be more of a small step. 175
IV.

ANALYSIS

Although delayed, the Minnesota Supreme Court finally applied
apparent authority to hospitals through its Popovich decision. 176 The court’s
application falls in line with other states, tying its reasoning to modern
hospital advertising. 177 The court’s virtually unrestricted standard shows the
court intends unobstructed vicarious liability for hospitals, so long as the
patient can prove the underlying negligence. 178 Because of this potential
liability, hospitals will look for ways to minimize their burden. 179

Id. Under this type of reliance, patients would need to prove they would choose a different
hospital whose physicians were employees if the patients were informed the hospital
physicians were independent contractors. Id. This is similar to the rule proposed by Allina.
See id. at 895.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J., dissenting). Justice Anderson goes on to point
out the meaninglessness of the rule once hospitals inevitably implement measures such as
disclosures and notices suggested by the majority to minimize liability. Id. at 902–03.
See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the accessibility of the relaxed standard).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 893–94 (discussing ways in which hospitals could minimize
or reallocate liability for independent contractor physicians); see also infra Part IV.C.2
(arguing the Minnesota Supreme Court is moving towards a nondelegable duty standard).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.B.2
(outlining a possible progression toward nondelegable duty).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d 885.
Id. at 897–98; see Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1992) (“The
development in the law of the doctrine of apparent authority is based on a number of
rationales . . . [including] the recognition that hospitals increasingly hold themselves out to
the public in expensive advertising campaigns as offering and rendering quality health care
services.”); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Fam. Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994)
(reasoning hospitals have large advertising budgets that induce the public to rely on the
hospital’s services in a competitive market); Hamilton, supra note 7, at 257–58.
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 895–98; infra Part IV.B (detailing how the relaxed standard
opens accessibility to patients looking to hold hospitals accountable).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 893–94; infra Part IV.C.1 (summarizing potential methods
to limit liability).
171

172

173
174
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Meanwhile, public policy moves vicarious liability theory toward
nondelegable duty doctrine. 180

A.

Evolution of Hospitals Lends Itself to the Application of Apparent
Authority

Given the transition of hospitals from charitable to profitable facilities
and the development and application of apparent authority to other areas
of Minnesota law, the Minnesota Supreme Court rightly applied apparent
authority to hospitals. 181 With a majority of other states already applying
apparent authority to hospitals, Minnesota was due to make this decision. 182
As framed by the majority, deciding not to apply apparent authority to
hospitals would have been an unprecedented categorical exemption
counteracting the doctrine’s very purpose. 183 Both Allina and Justice
Anderson attempted to frame the issue as a deserved exception, but the
arguments failed to persuade the majority. 184
The public’s perception of hospitals and emergency rooms played a
large role in applying apparent authority in hospitals, and much of that
perception is driven by hospitals themselves through advertising. 185 Modern
hospital emergency rooms provide care for patients regardless of class or
ability to pay. 186 Even so, hospitals rely on paying customers to fund the latest
technology and treatments in competition with other hospitals and advertise
their amenities to attract those customers. 187 The public, in turn, relies on
those advertisements and expects hospitals to provide exceptional care,
especially in emergency situations. 188
As hospitals cultivate financial benefits and grow their reputations
180
181
182
183

See infra Part IV.B.2.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 890–92; see supra Part II.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 892–93, 893 n.8.
Id. at 892–94. Neither the majority nor the dissent provides any example of another similar

categorical exemption to provide a comparison, implying the hospital exemption would be
the only such exemption from apparent authority. See id. at 899–903 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 892–94 (majority opinion); see id. at 899–903 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 894 (majority opinion); see McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 436 (stating
hospital advertising is the most important driver in the shift of public perception of hospitals
as acceptable litigation targets); Barnes, supra note 23, at 1064 (“[H]ospitals have become
victims of their own success as they have actively solicited business and marketed themselves
as multifaceted health care providers.”).
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2020).
See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 262 (citing Owens, supra note 12, at 1134); see also supra
Part II.A (summarizing the evolution of hospitals and their public perception in the United
States).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 897–98; see supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text
(discussing hospital advertising habits and subsequent public reliance).
184
185

186
187

188
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through their advertisements and services, patients remain largely unaware
of independent contractor arrangements that could leave them without
adequate recourse to obtain payment for injuries resulting from physician
negligence. 189 As large, profitable facilities, hospitals can—and should—
shoulder a portion of the financial burden of negligence claims against
independent contractors in their emergency rooms, since hospitals rely on
the income from the regular use of these services. 190 Holding hospitals
financially responsible for accidents caused by negligent physicians,
regardless of employment status, may compel hospitals to implement more
oversight and higher standards of care. 191 Otherwise, hospitals risk financial
and reputational losses. 192

B.

Juxtaposed Legal Standards Broaden Accountability While
Maintaining Underlying Medical Malpractice Doctrine

Although the Popovich court was persuasive in applying apparent
authority, the derived legal standard will likely need clarification in the
future. 193 Because the standard is so lenient, patients will easily include
hospitals in medical malpractice suits going forward. 194
The Minnesota Supreme Court spent little time analyzing what it
means for a hospital to hold itself out or how a hospital might update its
advertisements to prevent public misunderstanding as to its physicians. 195
Similarly, although the court attempted to bypass perceived issues with “butfor” reliance, based on Ohio’s relatively swift rule change, the standard
adopted may be too broad to be meaningful. 196 Under the current subjective
standard, most anyone can and will claim they relied on the hospital to select
the physician when seeking care in an emergency room and easily meet the
criteria for the reliance element. 197
Holding a hospital accountable for a negligent physician may be the
new normal under Minnesota’s new apparent authority rule, putting
nondelegable duty easily within reach. 198 However, while the elements to
involve hospitals under apparent authority may be easily proven, patients
still face a rigorous standard in proving medical malpractice against
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 897–98; see id. at n.20–21 (explaining patients often look to
hospitals, and not specific physicians, to provide care).
Id. at 894; see McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 436.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 893–94.
189

190
191

Id.
Id. at 902 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See supra Part III.C (discussing the leniency of the apparent authority standard chosen by
the Popovich majority).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 897–98.
See id. at 896–97. But see id. at 902 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority’s
192
193
194

195
196

reliance on Ohio’s “unworkable” standard).
Id. at 898 (majority opinion); Id. at 902 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 901–02 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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physicians. 199

1.

Relaxed Agency Standard Indicates Strong Will to Hold Hospitals
Accountable

As the dissent pointed out, the majority’s rule leaves little room for
hospitals to avoid liability under current circumstances. 200 Each element’s
broad parameters make hospital vicarious liability accessible to most
patients who receive negligent treatment from emergency room
physicians. 201 First, advertising alone can fulfill Minnesota’s holding out
requirement. 202 Then, the second element of reliance is subjective, making
it nearly irrefutable. 203

a.

Typical Advertising Fulfills Holding Out Requirement

The first element requires courts to review a hospital’s actions, as the
principal, to decide whether the hospital held itself out to the community as
providing emergency treatment from “qualified medical personnel.” 204 The
court’s formulation of this element is consistent with the element’s
construction in other jurisdictions, focusing heavily on hospitals’
advertisements and representations to their local communities. 205 Based on
current advertising habits for most hospitals in Minnesota and around the
country, this element is essentially a forgone conclusion. 206
The court notes in Popovich that “Allina, like other hospital systems,

199
200

See infra Part IV.B.3 (outlining applicability of underlying medical malpractice standard).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“Under the court’s rule, the

hospital is liable simply because it has independent contractors working in the emergency
room located in the physical building owned by the hospital; that is, based simply on the fact
that the hospital provides the space in which the nonemployee physician exercises
independent medical judgment.”). But see infra Part IV.C.1 (summarizing ways hospitals
may try to minimize liability in the wake of Popovich); Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 893–94
(pointing out methods for hospitals to address risks).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 320–21 (S.C. 2000) (stating application is not limited to
emergency rooms).
See infra Part IV.B.1.a.
See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 897 (“Focusing the fact-finder’s analysis on the hospital’s
representations to the public is consistent with the ways in which the practice of medicine
and the business of health care have changed significantly in the modern age.”).
Id. at 987–98 (referencing Eads v. Borman, 277 P.3d 503, 512 (Or. 2012); Clark v.
Southview Hosp. & Fam. Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994); and Sword v. NKC
Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 151 (Ind. 1999)).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 897 (explaining modern hospitals operate like businesses
and compete with each other through advertising); infra note 209 (citing current advertising
in the Twin Cities area).
201

202
203
204
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advertised the quality of its care to the public,” 207 and that those statements
to the public were similar to advertisements and other generalized conduct
found by other courts to satisfy the holding out element. 208 Allina’s
advertisements are no different than any other regional hospital system’s
advertisements. 209 In fact, any advertisement that offers emergency room
care will meet this requirement if it fails to advise the physicians are not
employees. 210 Since hospital system advertisements generally do not
explicitly delineate the relationships between hospitals and their physicians,
most advertisements will allow patients to easily prove the holding out
element. 211 This leaves only the second element of reliance, which is also
readily met due to its subjective nature. 212

b.

Subjective Reliance Easily Met, Not Easily Refuted

Though the court spent slightly more time discussing the reliance
element, the element is only marginally less predetermined than the holding
out element. Reliance is determined by the patient showing awareness of
the hospital’s representations of authority. 213 This awareness then manifests
itself in the patient’s subjective beliefs; patients only need to show they
“looked to the hospital, rather than to a particular doctor, to provide care.” 214
Since most patients seeking emergency room care rely on the hospital to
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 897. The court then quotes Allina’s specific advertisements:
referring to “[o]ur board-certified emergency medicine physicians and skilled, caring nurses,”
and that both hospitals “had a fully-staffed emergency department, capable of providing
emergency services twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.” Id. at 897–98.
Id. at 898 (referencing Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 151 (stating a representation also may be
“general and implied”)); see Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 856 (Wis.
1988) (noting hospitals create the appearance that employees will provide care by failing to
advise patients otherwise).
See,
e.g.,
Emergency
Services,
NORTH
MEM’L
HEALTH,
https://northmemorial.com/specialty/emergency/ [https://perma.cc/FE93-AFNB] (“We
have the sharpest skills and finest resources to treat you immediately. . . . [W]e coordinate
care and share physicians and resources for consistently exceptional results. Together, we
treat more than 100,000 customers a year . . . . Our multidisciplinary team works with you
to get you back to your multilayered, yet very singular life, stat.”); Emergency Center,
REGIONS
HOSPITAL,
https://www.healthpartners.com/care/hospitals/regions/specialties/emergency-center/
[https://perma.cc/3FBG-86W4] (“We provide renowned specialty care for burns, heart
conditions and much more. . . . We are led by board-certified emergency doctors and
specialists that are ready to help you 24/7. You’ll be surrounded by a team of people, working
together to quickly get you the care you need.”).
See supra notes 200, 208, and accompanying text (simply providing emergency care
(without advertising) can create the appearance of agency if the hospital does not advise
patients they are being treated by a non-employee).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 895.
Id. at 898 (“Specifically, the fact-finder should determine if the plaintiff relied on the
hospital to select the physician . . . to provide the necessary services.”).
207

208

209
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select and provide physicians and other medical professionals, 215 reliance is
also proven with relative ease. 216 Because the standard is subjective, hospitals
will have a hard time disproving patients’ reliance on the hospitals’
representations. 217 While the “but-for” reliance discussed in the majority’s
opinion was deemed “‘virtually impossible’ to meet,” 218 the subjective rule
adopted may be too obliging to provide any discernable difference between
apparent authority and strict liability. 219

1.

Nondelegable Duty: A Logical Progression

Minnesota’s apparent authority rule, as it stands, means hospitals will
almost certainly be held vicariously liable if their independent contractor
emergency room physicians are found negligent. 220 By instituting a rule with
such accessible elements, the court tacitly moved toward a nondelegable
duty standard. 221
The nondelegable duty standard is supported by public policy
arguments shared by apparent authority proponents—simply taken a step
further. 222 In imposing a nondelegable duty on hospitals, the Supreme Court
of South Carolina noted the underlying point in many cases is “expecting a
patient in an emergency situation to debate or comprehend the meaning
and extent of any representations by the hospital—which likely would be
based on an opinion gradually formed over the years and not on any single
representation—imposes an unfair and improper burden on the patient.” 223
Additionally, imposing a nondelegable duty often depends on the
underlying activity’s societal importance. 224 The Alaska Supreme Court used
this reasoning to hold that hospital emergency room patients are as
215
216

Id.
Id. at 902 (Anderson, J. dissenting) (“[A] hospital will have no ability to disprove the

subjective element of the test, and a plaintiff need do little more than identify the hospital to
establish hospital liability.”).
217
218

Id.
Id. at 896 (majority opinion) (quoting Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628

N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ohio 1994)).
See supra text accompanying note 172.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J. dissenting); see supra note 200.
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J. dissenting) (comparing the standard to
strict liability).
See supra Part II.B.2.c (discussing nondelegable duty doctrine and its policy reasoning).
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 321 (S.C. 2000) (“Given the
fundamental shift in the role that a hospital plays in our health care system, the
commercialization of American medicine, and the public perception of the unity of a hospital
and its emergency room, we hold that a hospital owes a nondelegable duty to render
competent service to its emergency room patients.”).
Montefusco, supra note 23, at 1361–62 (noting that accepted nondelegable duties in other
areas of law “are considered so important to the community that the responsibility for their
execution cannot be transferred to another entity” and that “[c]ourts should extend the
doctrine of nondelegable duty to hospital operations for the same reason.”).
219
220
221

222
223
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deserving of protection as common carrier passengers, where common
carriers have a nondelegable duty to ensure passenger safety. 225 Public
perception of hospitals drives much of the nondelegable duty discussion. 226
Further, patients experiencing an emergency generally do not have the
time to bypass the closest emergency room to find one staffed by
employees. 227 Under these circumstances, the nondelegable duty standard
has strong supporting policy arguments that parallel the arguments used to
apply apparent authority. 228 Therefore, the doctrine is in line with apparent
authority. 229

2.

Strict Standard for Prima Facie Medical Malpractice Cases Buffers
Impact of Broadened Hospital Vicarious Liability

Although the new apparent authority standard applied to hospitals will
be fairly easy for patients to prove, the underlying medical malpractice and
negligence cases retain their stringent requirements. 230 As a practical matter,
while Minnesota’s apparent authority standard likely needs clarification,
plaintiffs must prove a prima facie case for negligence or medical
malpractice against the physicians themselves before hospitals can be held
vicariously liable. 231 The new apparent authority standard may make it easier
for plaintiffs to include hospitals in their claims, but this underlying standard

Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1384 (Alaska 1987), overturned due to legislative action.
Jackson was only partially overturned. See infra note 265 (noting that Jackson was superseded
225

in part by ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096 (2000)).
See supra Part II.B.2.c (discussing the public policy shaping nondelegable duty doctrine in
hospitals); see also Alison Chen, Hospital Liability: Nondelegable Duty in Hospital
Emergency Rooms - Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center, 24 AM. J.L. & MED.
135, 136 (1998) (“Imposing a nondelegable duty on hospitals therefore is consonant with the
public's perception of the unity of hospitals’ services.”).
Chen, supra note 226, at 136 (citing Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 498 S.E.2d 408
(S.C. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd as modified, 533 S.E.2d 312 (S.C. 2000)).
Compare Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980),
cert. denied, 611 A.2d 657 (N.J. 1992) (“Given the relationship of the emergency room to
the full-service hospital, and the crisis circumstances under which people seek emergency
treatment, public policy requires that the hospital not be able to artificially screen itself from
liability for malpractice in the emergency room.”), with Popovich v. Allina Health Sys., 946
N.W.2d 885, 894 (Minn. 2020).
See supra note 228.
See McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); St. PaulMercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 559, 4 N.W.2d 637, 638 (1942);
see also Owens, supra note 12, at 1144 (describing how apparent agency could become much
more difficult to apply because it is grounded in plaintiff’s reliance upon the apparent
relationship because the “court must not only determine if there was malpractice, but also
whether there was reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.”).
See McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 447 (“Appellant's case was premised on showing the
physician had committed medical malpractice. . . . Thus, it follows that if the physician is not
liable as a matter of law the medical center cannot be found liable.”).
226

227

228

229
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will continue to help prevent frivolous lawsuits. 232 Ultimately, hospitals will
only be held vicariously liable if a prima facie case is first established. 233

B.

Popovich’s Impact: A Look at Conceivable Hospital and Judicial
Responses

Although Minnesota is relatively late in applying apparent authority in
hospital emergency rooms, the Minnesota Supreme Court used strong
public policy arguments to support its decision. 234 It made the rule purposely
lenient—making it easily accessible to most patients. 235 The court reviewed
how other states revised their applications of apparent authority to hospitals
and used those already-updated rules as the basis for Minnesota’s rule. 236
Consequently, hospitals will be eager to implement measures to limit
potential liability from apparent authority in the wake of Popovich. 237 While
hospitals consider how to minimize liability, United States public policy
becomes more receptive to nondelegable duty for hospital care. 238

1.

Hospitals’ Attempts to Minimize Liability

In response to potential apparent authority liability, hospitals could
update advertising or implement additional notices and disclaimers. Aside
from implementing policies to monitor hospital facility care, the Popovich
court specifically suggested that hospitals allocate risk by updating their
agreements with independent contractors. 239

a.

Advertising, Notices, and Disclaimers

First, hospitals may update their disclaimers and signs in the
emergency rooms. Even so, it is unlikely they will deviate from their
advertising to widely inform the public of their independent contractor
relationships with their physicians because those arrangements do not fit
with the all-inclusive care typically advertised. 240 That kind of information
could prompt risk-conscious patients to choose to seek care elsewhere or

Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 890 (stating the merits of the medical malpractice claims were
not before the court—implying they would need to be considered on remand).
See id.; see also McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 447 (noting that patients must first prove the
physician was liable).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 894.
See id.; see also id. at 901 (Anderson J., dissenting) (stating it is relatively easy to see the
reliance and the resulting damages in apparent authority claims).
Id. at 896–97 (majority opinion) (discussing Ohio cases).
Id. at 893–94 n.11; see infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing which measures might be used).
See infra Part IV.C.2.
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 893–94.
Id. at 897–98; see McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 436 (noting public perception
has been hospitals’ marketing themselves as full-service healthcare providers).
232

233

234
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avoid that hospital in an emergency. 241 Moreover, if widely known because
of advertising, losing numerous patients could be crippling. 242 Instead,
hospitals will likely opt for notices inside the emergency room and
disclaimers in their paperwork, since many patients—especially those truly
in an emergency situation—will be less likely to leave once there. 243
Nevertheless, case law from other jurisdictions shows even disclaimers
and notices must meet certain criteria to insulate hospitals from liability. 244
Generally, notices in emergency rooms must be prominently displayed and
of a certain size to be effective. 245 Additionally, any disclaimers in admittance
paperwork must be in a standard size font (i.e., not in a paragraph with
substantially smaller font than the rest of the document) and not otherwise
obscured. 246 It is not enough to hide the disclaimer in an inconspicuous
paragraph of an admission form. 247 The point is to legitimately notify patients
See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text (describing advertising habits and the
intentions behind them).
See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 436 (noting how maintaining pace with other
hospitals and reliance on patient monetary support necessitated advertising).
Isbey, supra note 33, at 1147 (“[I]t is likely that by the time the patient enters the hospital,
he is unable or unwilling to leave the hospital simply because this employment relationship
is missing, even if he is completely aware of it.”).
Williams v. Tissier, 165 N.E.3d 885, 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019), appeal denied, 144 N.E.3d
1209 (Ill. 2020); Adam Alstott, Hospital Liability for Negligence of Independent Contractor
Physicians Under Principles of Apparent Agency, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 485, 499–500 (2004)
(citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096(a) (2003)) (“Alaska explicitly allows hospitals to escape
liability in emergency room contexts if the patient is afforded notice of the physician’s
independent contractor status. . . . Nonetheless, the hospital is not exonerated if it did not
exercise reasonable care in granting the negligent physician privileges.”). But see Clark v.
Southview Hosp. & Fam. Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 54 n.1 (Ohio 1994) (noting that in
order to be effective, notices “must come at a meaningful time” and that notifying patients in
consent forms provided upon admission or on signs posted in emergency rooms would not
necessarily insulate hospitals from liability, especially for patients suffering medical
emergencies).
See Tissier, 165 N.E.3d at 895 (noting that “[i]n determining the effect of an independent
contractor disclosure in a consent form, reviewing courts have considered the precise
language and the location of the disclosure”); see also Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714
N.E.2d 142, 151 (Ind. 1999) (acknowledging the central question is how the hospital
provided notice to the patient that the treating physician was an independent contractor and
not an employee of the hospital).
See Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 151. But at least one court found even bold typeface may not
be meaningful notice. See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 259 (“[T]he court looked to the case
law of other states to delineate what constitutes meaningful notice. Boren held as a matter of
law that a disclaimer written in boldfaced type and signed by the patient did not constitute
meaningful notice.”); Tissier, 165 N.E.3d at 895 (“[T]here could be situations in which a
patient has signed a consent form containing a disclaimer regarding an employment or
agency relationship, but additional facts may exist that would create a triable issue of fact as
to whether a hospital held a physician out as its agent.”).
Boren ex rel. Boren v. Weeks, 251 S.W.3d 426, 437 (Tenn. 2008) (“While the hospital
included a disclaimer in the consent form, we cannot say as a matter of law that the disclaimer
241

242
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and allow them to decide for themselves whether they still accept treatment
from the hospital’s independent contractor physicians, knowing the hospital
will not be vicariously liable for the physicians’ negligence. 248
These requirements show a propensity toward disallowing hospitals to
evade liability without properly informing unsuspecting patients. 249 Some
courts already decided the notices must not only meet specific criteria as to
size and location, but they must be provided at an opportune time. 250
Therefore, hospitals walk a fine line between properly informing patients
(before they seek treatment) and risking that informed patients will not
accept treatment under those arrangements or avoid the hospital entirely. 251
On the other hand, the very same paperwork used by hospitals to
attempt to disclaim liability for independent contractor physicians may also
be what ultimately holds them to a nondelegable duty standard. 252 Courts in
other jurisdictions found that these hospital forms may create a
nondelegable duty to provide a certain level of care. 253 With this in mind,
the more effective approach for hospitals to shield themselves from
independent contractor physician negligence is through their contracts with
provided the Borens with adequate notice under the circumstances.”). The Boren court
pointed to a Georgia Court of Appeals decision in its analysis. Id. at 436–37 (quoting Cooper
v. Binion, 598 S.E.2d 6, 11–12 (2004)) (“The acknowledgment in the admitting form was
one of thirteen paragraphs in a two-page document signed by [plaintiff's] wife, and nothing
indicates that the hospital called attention to the acknowledgment.”).
Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 54; see Tissier, 165 N.E.3d at 895 (“The existence of a signed consent
form containing a clear, concise, and unambiguous ‘independent contractor’ disclaimer is an
important fact to consider in evaluating the ‘holding out’ element, but it is not dispositive.”);
Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 152 (“Under some circumstances, such as in the case of a medical
emergency, however, written notice may not suffice if the patient had an inadequate
opportunity to make an informed choice.”).
See Mary Dameron Stuart, Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center: The New
South Carolina Rule on Hospital Liability for Malpractice of Emergency Room Physicians,
52 S.C. L. REV. 975, 985, 987–88 (2001) (stating that “[w]hile it is clear that simply posting
signs and having consent forms signed will not be sufficient,” courts have not provided
enough guidance as to what notice would be sufficient). “Because imposing the ostensibleagency doctrine could result in broader attempts by hospitals to inform their patients and
thus avoid liability, some courts have decided to take the full leap and impose an absolute
nondelegable duty on the hospital.” Id.
Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 54; Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 320 (S.C.
2000) (referencing Clark).
See supra notes 240–50 and accompanying text.
See Pope v. Winter Park Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 939 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (“[I]t is undisputed that an express contract exists between the Popes and Winter Park
Hospital, and we have concluded that an issue remains unresolved concerning the scope of
the express contractual undertaking which may have given rise to a duty to provide nonnegligent neonatal care to baby Tyler.”).
See id. (“[W]e agree that Florida law does not currently recognize an implied nondelegable
duty on the part of a hospital to provide competent medical care to its patients. Florida law
does recognize, however, that such a duty can be undertaken pursuant to an express
contract.”).
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those physicians. 254

b.

Indemnification Clauses in Independent Contractor Contracts

Indemnification clauses in hospital contracts with independent
contractor physicians will likely be the most effective means for hospitals to
divert liability. 255 These clauses mean the physicians will indemnify the
hospital and be financially responsible for all negligence claims against the
physicians. 256 To ensure maximum effectiveness, hospitals should require
physicians to hold individual liability insurance. This should include a
minimum amount of coverage high enough to guarantee coverage for highcost claims, naming the hospital as an additional insured. 257 Under these
arrangements, patients will still receive adequate payment for any damages
or injuries resulting from physician negligence, but the cost will be borne by
the negligent actor, with little cost shouldered by the hospital. 258
As hospitals attempt to minimize apparent authority liability, some
courts already found certain duties to be nondelegable, especially
concerning emergency room treatment, indicating a potential trend. 259 The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s sympathetic legal standard for plaintiffs here
may suggest Minnesota is open to the possibility of a nondelegable duty
theory. 260 Thus, these indemnification clauses will be indispensable to
hospitals. 261

2.

Courts’ Budding Receptiveness Toward Nondelegable Duty
Doctrine

The Minnesota Supreme Court did not consider a nondelegable duty
theory in Popovich, but the theory could be on the horizon, depending on
how the law, public policy, and emergency room medical care continue to
evolve. 262 For now, the Minnesota Supreme Court appears to endorse
254
255
256
257

Ingram, supra note 145, at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id. These arrangements can be made in a number of cost-effective ways. Id. at 229 n.57

(“In some cases it might be more effective for the hospital to obtain insurance for itself and
all its physicians on a group basis. The cost of this insurance could then be allocated to the
physician as part of the overall contractual arrangement.”).
Id. at 229. “The only ultimate cost to the hospital would be the occasional case where the
physician’s insurance and personal assets were insufficient to pay a negligence claim.” Id. at
230 n.61.
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 454.
See Popovich v. Allina Health Sys., 946 N.W.2d 885, 897–98 (Minn. 2020); see also supra
Part IV.B.1 (summarizing the lenient standard and its proximity to the nondelegable duty
doctrine).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 897–98; supra Part IV.B.1 (leaving indemnification clauses
as the only means left for hospitals to avoid liability if their duty is nondelegable).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 885; see also McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 456–
258
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methods available to hospitals to avoid liability. 263 Even still, the majority’s
reasoning and leniency suggest the court could easily find public policy
reasons to disallow avoidance in the future. 264
Although at least two states expressly reject the application of
nondelegable duty to hospitals, at least four states already apply the
doctrine. 265 Public perception, and therefore public policy, bends toward
viewing hospitals as multifaceted medical teams who provide essential, often
life-saving, services that amount to a public safety concern. 266 Emergency
rooms are inherently high-risk—patients’ lives hang in the balance, relying
on the physicians to save them from the very real possibility of death. 267
Perhaps independent contractor arrangements—or the delegation of duty—
should be reserved for lower risk areas in the practice of medicine where
patients have more control over who provides their treatment and where
patients are not reliant on treatment in life-or-death situations. 268
If Minnesota moves to a nondelegable duty standard in the future, it
will likely be achieved via legislative or administrative regulation updates
because that is the most concrete avenue currently recognized by the
courts. 269 It will be interesting to see whether the Minnesota Legislature or
57 (discussing public policy perceptions and the debate over whether medical practice is
inherently dangerous).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 893–94.
See generally id. (using public policy arguments throughout the decision and pointing to
policy arguments from other jurisdictions).
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 318–19 (S.C. 2000). “Texas and
Missouri courts have rejected the nondelegable duty doctrine in connection with care
provided by emergency room physicians.” Id. at 319 (citing Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v.
Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. 1998); Kelly v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City, 826
S.W.2d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)). The Simmons court noted Alaska, Florida, and New
York had all applied a nondelegable duty to hospitals for emergency room care and applied
the doctrine itself. Id. (citing Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987);
superseded in part by ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096 (2000); Irving v. Drs. Hosp. of Lake
Worth, Inc., 415 So.2d 55, 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 523
N.Y.S.2d 342, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)).
Chen, supra note 226, at 136 (citing Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 498 S.E.2d 408
(S.C. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd as modified, 533 S.E.2d 312 (S.C. 2000)) (“As hospitals []
263
264

265

266

increasingly provide immediate, around-the-clock medical care, emergency rooms become
of vital import to public safety. . . . [P]atients seeking emergency assistance generally cannot
choose to pass by the nearest emergency room in hopes of finding a hospital whose
emergency services are staffed by employees rather than independent contractors.”)
(emphasis added).
See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 457 (quoting Beeck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp.,
500 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)).
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 898; see also McWilliams & Russell, supra note 10, at 454–
57 (identifying cases where courts suggest that high-risk medical procedures should be
nondelegable).
See James W. Gustafson, Jr. & Thomas D. Masterson, Suing the Hospital When Superdoc
Falls, 38 TRIAL 20, 23 (May 2002) (“[P]laintiff attorneys should carefully review the state
267
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the Minnesota Department of Health reacts to Popovich and whether any
residual effects from the decision push Minnesota toward nondelegable
duty for hospitals. Any reactions by these state departments will likely be
met with lobbying from opposing groups: patient advocates and hospital
systems. Even if there are no legislative or administrative updates, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has shown a willingness to review hospital
liability to patients in light of public policy updates. 270 Thus, the court could
find a compelling reason to use common law to find a contractual basis to
impose a nondelegable duty standard in hospital emergency rooms in the
not-so-distant future.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Supreme Court joined a majority of other states in
applying the vicarious liability doctrine of apparent authority to hospitals for
negligent non-employee physicians in emergency rooms. 271 The Popovich
decision follows the general trend throughout the United States of holding
hospitals vicariously liable for the negligence of emergency room physicians,
regardless of employment status. 272 As noted by the dissent, the court’s
adopted legal standard lands very close to strict liability for hospitals if their
physicians are found negligent. 273
Notwithstanding the Minnesota Supreme Court’s lenient legal
standard for plaintiffs, the court suggests hospitals can manage the added
risks through indemnification clauses in independent contractor agreements
and providing notice through advertisements, signs, and disclosures. 274 As
the law develops in this area and medical advancements continue, hospitals
will have a vested interest in updating their contracts with independent
contractor physicians and attempting to change public perceptions regarding
emergency rooms and the physicians therein. 275 As hospitals find new ways
to avoid liability, it remains to be seen whether public policy will shift away
from holding hospitals liable or progress toward a nondelegable duty for
hospitals to provide non-negligent care, especially in emergency rooms.
licensing statutes and regulations applicable to the hospital. . . . state licensing statutes and
regulations often set forth minimum standards for operating hospitals and surgical centers.”);
see also Stuart, supra note 249, at 979 (stating that South Carolina statutes evidence a public
policy encouraging hospital liability for emergency room torts). “[I]f the regulations are
considered together, they provide support for the public policy that hospitals have a duty to
afford competent care to patients in their emergency room facilities.” Id.
See Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 894 (discussing public policy).
Id. at 898.
See supra Part II.B; see also Hamilton, supra note 7, at 263–66 (explaining how agency by
estoppel and apparent agency are used to hold hospitals vicariously liable for the negligent
actions of non-employee physicians).
Popovich, 946 N.W.2d at 901 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 893–94 n.11 (majority opinion).
See supra Part IV.C.1 (outlining possible hospital updates).
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